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In response to the spread of the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19), plenty of control
measures were proposed. To assess the impact of current control measures on the number
of new case indices 14 countries with the highest confirmed cases, highest mortality rate,
and having a close relationship with the outbreak’s origin; were selected and analyzed.
Methods
In the study, we analyzed the impact of five control measures, including centralized isolation
of all confirmed cases, closure of schools, closure of public areas, closure of cities, and clo-
sure of borders of the 14 targeted countries according to their timing; by comparing its abso-
lute effect average, its absolute effect cumulative, and its relative effect average.
Results
Our analysis determined that early centralized isolation of all confirmed cases was repre-
sented as a core intervention in significantly disrupting the pandemic’s spread. This strategy
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helped in successfully controlling the early stage of the outbreak when the total number of
cases were under 100, without the requirement of the closure of cities and public areas,
which would impose a negative impact on the society and its economy. However, when the
number of cases increased with the apparition of new clusters, coordination between cen-
tralized isolation and non-pharmaceutical interventions facilitated control of the crisis
efficiently.
Conclusion
Early centralized isolation of all confirmed cases should be implemented at the time of the
first detected infectious case.
Introduction
In December 2019, the world turned its gaze towards Wuhan, Hubei province, China, due to
the emergence of a novel cluster with a pneumonia-like disease [1]. Following exposure histo-
ries of reported cases, these patients mostly worked or had contact with traders at the Huanan
Seafood Market, where many wildlife species were sold and slaughtered. In a short time, this
spreading infection was no longer limited to China but rapidly penetrated other countries
such as Vietnam, Japan, and Thailand, which had recorded cases outside of China [2]. Corona-
virus disease 2019 (COVID-19), a newly emerging infection raised from the virus mentioned
above, is an acute respiratory infectious disease, caused by a new member of the Coronavirus’s
family, called Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus-2 (SARS-CoV-2) [3]. On
March 11, 2020, the WHO declared a global pandemic due to COVID-19, with 118,319 con-
firmed cases [4]. Just one month later, the world witnessed more than 1.6 million confirmed
cases, with approximately 100,000 deaths worldwide [5]. Since the last two large-scale out-
breaks of the two coronavirus-type epidemics in the 21st century, including the Severe Acute
Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) outbreak, which was first identified in the Guangdong province
of China in 2002 [6]; and the Middle East Respiratory Syndrome (MERS) outbreak, which was
first reported in Saudi Arabia in 2012 [7]; this new crisis has once again deeply impacted peo-
ple around the world. It confused healthcare workers alike, particularly epidemiologists.
Despite valuable experiences in dealing with the previous pandemics, controlling an unknown,
highlycontagious respiratory disease, caused by a new coronavirus, is still extremely
challenging.
In response to the spread of COVID-19, a plethora of control measures had been proposed
and recommended by public health authorities and international organizations from countries
around the world. A list of non-pharmaceutical interventions at different levels and various
strategies had been established to prevent and mitigate the continual spread of COVID-19,
including but not limited to social distancing and barriers with the closure of schools and
avoiding modes of public transportation, isolation of suspected and confirmed cases, and
rapid closure of borders. However, these lockdown policies had multiple negatives. Miles et al.
determined that the lockdown cost was 40% higher than the highest benefits from avoiding the
worst mortality case scenario at full life expectancy tariff [8]. For mental health, Adams-Prassl
et al. recognized that citizens living in states with implementation of lockdowns scored 0.085
standard deviations lower on the standardized WHO-5 mental health index compared to
those living in states without a lockdown strategy [9]. Despite its negative impacts, potentially
measuring lockdown implementation also effectively proved its ability to aid in controlling the
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pandemic, and it remains a question that we hope to elucidate. Thus, our study made an effort
to summarize and highlight distinctive features of significant control measures among 14 par-
ticular countries, including China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore, Korea, Japan, the United
States, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, Canada, Italy, Spain, and Sweden. With this
approach, we hope to contribute a comprehensive understanding of COVID-19 and determine
the core interventions which may help to contain this enemy.
Materials and methods
Study population
In order to assess the impact of current control measures on the number of new cases during
70 days from 22 January 2020 (when John Hopkins Coronavirus Resource Center began to
collect the data of COVID-19) to the end of March 2020, we have collected data from countries
that had the highest number of daily confirmed cases. The United States, Canada, and China,
with the highest population of general population, were chosen due to their representative
characteristics. 5 Asian countries and 5 European countries with the percentage of days having
the highest number of daily confirmed cases higher than 60% were chosen for later analysis.
Additionally, Sweden, a North European country that decided to live in peace with the virus,
was chosen as a European control country, as it chose to go without both lockdown and cen-
tralized isolation. Details of the percentage of days having the highest number of daily con-
firmed cases of 13 countries were outlined in the S1 Table.
Data collection
Available information from peer-reviewed and respected sources with real-time updated data-
sets, including the John Hopkins Coronavirus Resource Center (JHU) and WHO Situation
Reports, were retrieved and subsequently analyzed. The total number of confirmed cases,
deaths, and day-by-day new cases, as well as the first confirmed COVID-19 case and the first
community-acquired case within each country, were determined. Regarding Sweden, since the
testing policy primarily focused on citizens with symptoms associated with COVID-19 infec-
tion and requirements for inpatient hospital care and/or elderly care, people with mild symp-
toms were not required to contact their healthcare providers [10]. Thus the number of new
confirmed cases in Sweden reported from JHU might be lower than the actual new confirmed
cases. To address this limitation, we have estimated the number of new confirmed cases in
Sweden by using the number of new confirmed cases of neighboring European countries such
as Spain, Italy, the United Kingdom, France, and Germany at the moment; without application
of any control measures. Our analysis revealed that the actual new confirmed cases in Sweden
were 8.47 times higher than reported by JHU (S2 Table).
Afterward, our team parsed out the real-time enrollment data extracted from official gov-
ernmental announcements, health ministry updates, creditable and verified articles; to point
out the control measures issued by each country with respect to the size of its outbreak accord-
ing to the timeline. We used data collected from January 20, 2020 to May 11, 2020, at which
point most countries started to reopen schools and ceased social distancing protocols. Further-
more, we made a systematic summary of all of the available control measures from websites
and country-specific sources by categorizing them into four groups: preventive measures,
social distancing-related measures, associated government measures, and associated research
measures. Lockdown strategies according to each level (1 to 4), were divided into five subsets:
a(centralized isolation of all confirmed cases), b(closure of schools), c(closure of public areas),
d(closure of cities), and e(closure of borders) (S3 and S4 Tables). In China, Taiwan, and Hong
Kong, all suspected and confirmed cases were isolated in healthcare facilities and could be
PLOS ONE Early centralized isolation strategy for all confirmed cases of COVID-19
PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0254012 July 15, 2021 3 / 17
ruled out after a negative SARS-CoV-2 test with at least 24-hour intervals regardless of the
number of days of isolation. In South Korea and Singapore, 14 days of mandatory isolation
was applied for all suspected and confirmed cases of COVID-19. In Japan, only suspected and
confirmed cases with related symptoms were isolated at the hospitals, whereas the remaining
cases without any symptoms were strictly quarantined at medical camps or hotels under medi-
cal staff supervision during a required time. Even though the policy of centralized isolation of
all confirmed cases was modified across these six countries, we assumed these control mea-
sures were comparable when applied. Thus, centralized isolation of all confirmed cases is
defined as a quarantine of all confirmed cases in hospitals, medical camps, or hotels under the
supervision of medical staff and during a time period set forth by each country’s government.
Closure of schools was applied with the suspension of all cultural, educational, sports, and
teaching activities. Closure of public areas consisted of non-essential business, including
stores, shopping centers, and services, such as bars, restaurants, cinemas, theaters, as well as
the prohibition of mass gathering. Additionally, citizens were requested to remain home and
leave only for essential activities, work from home if possible, and maintain 6 feet of social dis-
tancing at all times. Closure of cities involved the restrictions on travel with the suspension of
all forms of transportation across cities. Closure of borders is defined as the official announce-
ment of the governments regarding the prohibition of entry and exit of all individuals from all
entries, including lands, seas, rails, and air routes. Particularly, to address the heterogeneity of
the date of implementation of control measures in countries with various states and cities such
as the United States, Canada, and China, we assumed that the first date of applying the lock-
down strategies is the representative date for these countries. Details of the date of the control
measures mentioned above in each city and state of the United States, Canada, and China with
reliable references; were summarized in S5 Table.
Data management
We divided our members into subgroups that were responsible for data collection of assigned
countries. Each country was optimally assigned to a member with different nationalities to
avoid selection and information biases. Three independent reviewers did data extraction to
ensure accuracy and validation. Any discrepancies were dissolved by discussion among mem-
bers and a senior author to reach a final consensus. The cleaned data was uploaded and stored
to a Google drive encrypted by a password. Only the senior author and the supervisor have the
right to access all data.
Data analysis
In the study, we analyzed the impact of each control measure adopted by the governments of
the 14 targeted countries, according to each country’s timing, to highlight and assess its signifi-
cance in keeping the outbreak under control. Since vaccines and target drugs were not avail-
able in March 2020, current interventions could only control the number of new cases.
However, the number of newly infected cases was greatly affected by the number of existing
cases due to the human-to-human spread of COVID-19. Consequently, an analysis of the
infection trend through the trend of a new case index was applied. Indeed, if an intervention
effectively helps control the incidence of new cases, then the new case index of infection will
decrease.
In this study, we used the Causal Impact package to analyze the effectiveness of the inter-
vention. It was designed to find the law of cause and effect of the intervention if it is impossible
to generate a randomized controlled trial. We used the Bayesian inference method with Mar-
kov chains Monte Carlo (MCMC), 20,000 bootstrap times to create control data with the trend
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of the original data series before the time of intervention. After the time of data, intervention
continued to be created, but with two different trends: (1) from actual data through Bayes rea-
soning with MCMC and 20,000 bootstrap times created the data series with intervention; and
(2) the control data series is used for trending and the probability of pre-intervention data to
create a post-period (without intervention assumption).
Then, the two chains formed were compared with each other regarding the absolute effect
average, the absolute effect cumulative, the relative effect average, the posterior probability of a
causal effect, and the posterior tail-area probability p. The absolute effect average was defined
as the average percent decrease rate of the trend after intervention/day. The absolute effect
cumulative was determined as the sum of the absolute effect average. The relative effect average
was the actual percentage that decreased after the intervention, and the posterior probability of
a causal effect is the repeatability of causality. Five control measures, including centralized iso-
lation of all confirmed cases, closure of schools, closure of public areas, closure of cities, and
closure of borders, were evaluated among countries. From the literature, the average incuba-
tion period for SARS-Cov-2 is 5.2 days with the 95% confidence interval of the distribution at
13 days [11]. However, we encountered a delay in the time reporting of data compared to the
testing time in reality. There were some possible reasons for this. Firstly, there were 13 days of
average incubation period as mentioned above. Secondly, the differences in time zones
between 14 countries could lead to the differences in reporting the data to the public between
JHU and these countries. Besides, from April 2020, the JHU database only updated data at the
constant time from 3:30–4:00 pm (UTC). Thirdly, there was a lack of simultaneousness in
reporting confirmed cases, recovered cases, and death cases of COVID-19. To solve this issue,
we conducted the study with the hypothesis that the time between testing and reporting in offi-
cial statistics could be fluctuating from one day to four days with the details were described in
S6 Table. After the analysis, the results showed that the data changes due to the fluctuation of
time between testing and reporting in official statistics led to insignificant differences of
0–3.5% (CI 95%). Thus, we decided to select day 13th as a time point for analysis.
To consistently assess across countries, we used the time when the country had a confirmed
case of a 10th infection as the first day, except for China. This moment is considered an alert
time since many countries initiated adjusting their control measures. Additionally, it facilitated
the evaluation of the effectiveness of the centralized isolation of all confirmed cases. China
alone used the first day on January 20, 2020, when China was in the central wake of the disease
announcement. Therefore, our analysis process adhered to the following assumptions: (1)
assess the intervention’s effectiveness starting on the 13th day after the intervention was imple-
mented; and (2) countries applying the interventions could simultaneously offer solutions,
sometimes very far apart. Thus, we only separated the interventions when the interval between
two consecutive interventions was greater than 13 days; and (3) if the interventions were less
than 13 days apart, we would only analyze the overall effectiveness of the interventions calcu-
lated after 13 days of the last implementation.
Results
The dates of implementation of the four levels of lock-down strategies at the moment of the
10th confirmed cases are outlined in Table 1. Based on our findings, Korea’s data was analyzed
at three different moments, which were on the 27th day with centralized isolation of all con-
firmed cases, the 32nd day with the closure of schools, and the 22nd day with the closure of pub-
lic areas. With the data for China, we analyzed the 14th day, when the country applied
centralized isolation of all confirmed cases, and the 54th day when they closed the entire coun-
try. Regarding Japan’s data, we analyzed the 16th day of centralized isolation of all confirmed
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cases of COVID-19, together with the analysis of the 33rd day when Japan closed its schools.
We evaluated Singapore’s data on the 58th day when they closed their public areas and the 70th
day when they closed their schools. Exceptionally, we analyzed the 12th day as Taiwan initiated
opening their schools and the 55th day when they closed their public areas. Hong Kong, Singa-
pore, and Taiwan were not analyzed for the effect of centralized isolations of all confirmed
cases because the pre-intervention time was too short. Sweden was excluded from all of the
above control measures since this country denied to against the virus. The date of implementa-
tion of the national intervention at the moment of the 10th confirmed cases is outlined in
Table 1. And its reference link is presented in S7 Table.
Table 2 showed that when the above countries applied neither methods a,b,c,d,e, pre-inter-
vention new case indices [100% x (new cases/active cases)] ranged from 12.60% to 25.98%. At
this time, countries only applied centralized isolationa of all confirmed cases without methods
b,c,d,e, including Taiwan (11 days before the 10th case), Singapore (8 days before the 10th case),
and Hong Kong (4 days before the 10th case); their pre-intervention new case indices were
8.36%, 8.93%, and 11.38%, respectively. On the other hand, with centralized isolation of all
confirmed casesa, the closure of schoolsb and public areasc, with or without the closure of
cities;d showed the effectiveness by decreasing the new case indices in Korea and China after
13 days. When China solely applied methoda, its pre-intervention new case index was 17.29%
(12.90%, 22.04%). China’s post-intervention index decreased to 0.72% (0.52%, 0.96%) when
the country applied methodsa,b,c,d. South Korea’s pre-intervention new case index was 13.98%
(9.13%, 19.93%), and its post-intervention index decreased to 1.34% (1.12%, 1.58%) with the
induction of methodsa,b,c. An illustration of the change in the new case index according to the
application of different intervention strategies was represented in S1 Fig.
Applying measures of social distancing simultaneously, including b(closure of schools),
c(closure of public places), and e(closure of borders) without d(closure of cities); helped Can-
ada, France, and Germany to reduce their absolute effect averages (AEA) to10% (p<0.001),
15% (p<0.01), and 11% (p<0.01), respectively. Notably, the AEA of Spain, Italy, and the
United States reached 21%, 24%, and 12%, respectively; when these countries applied b(closure
Table 1. Date of implementation of the national intervention at the moment of the 10th confirmed cases.
Country Centralized isolation all
confirmed cases
Closure of schools Closure of public areas Closure of cities Closure of borders
Date Days Date Days Date Days Date Days Date Days
Spain NA 11 March 15 14 March 18 14 March 18 16 March 20
Italy NA 4 March 13 10 March 19 8 March 17 10 March 19
UK NA 18 March 24 20 March 26 NA NA
Canada NA 14 March 20 15 March 21 NA 18 March 24
US NA 12 March 39 15 March 42 19 March 46 21 March 48
France NA 16 March 38 14 March 36 22 March 44 17 March 39
Germany NA 16 March 44 16 March 44 NA 16 March 44
China 2 February 14 27 January 1 23 January 4 23 January 4 28-Mar 69
Korea 26 February 27 2 March 32 21 February 22 NA NA
Japan 14 February 16 2 March 33 16 April 78 16 April 78 8 March 39
Singapore 23 January -8 8 April 70 27 March 58 NA 23 March 54
Hong Kong 26 January -4 25 January 6 28 March 60 NA 25 March 57
Taiwan 21 January -11 2 February 12 25 March 55 NA 18 March 48
Sweden NA NA NA NA NA
NA: Not application.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0254012.t001
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of schools), c(closure of public places), d(closure of cities), and e(closure of borders) (p
<0.0001). The AEA of the UK decreased to 16% (p<0.0001) with the closure of their schoolsb
and public areasc. In Taiwan, there was an increase in AEA to 4.3% (1.2%, 7.5%) after Taiwan
reopened their schools. Modification of absolute effect average in each country according to
the application of different intervention strategies was depicted in S2 Fig. This result demon-
strated that the closure of schools played an essential role in controlling the rise of new cases of
COVID-19 in Taiwan.
Based on the implementation of methodsa,b,c,d,e, this study categorized 14 countries into
two groups, group A and group B (Fig 1). Group A included Asian countries with strict lock-
down policies (Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, Japan, and China) and Asian countries
Table 2. Decreasing new case indices of countries by intervention solution.




Absolute effect average (AEA)
(% - 95%CI)
Relative effect average (%
- 95%CI)
Posterior probability of a
causal effect
SpainNo ! b,c,d,e 25.98 (21.28, 31.10) 5.92 (4.73, 7.11) 21 (14, 28) 78 (51, 106) 99.995����
Spainb,c,d,e ! b,d,e 5.92 (4.73, 7.11) 1.84 (1.39, 2.41) 4.3 (2.3, 6.3) 70 (37, 103) 99.995����
Italy No ! b,c,d,e 25.92 (20.53, 32.48) 3.86 (3.22, 4.56) 24 (16, 32) 87 (58, 117) 99.995����
United Kingdom No
! b,c
22.14 (17.61, 27.23) 7.53 (6.30, 8.92) 16 (7.9, 24) 68 (34, 103) 99.980���
United Kingdom b,c
! b
7.53 (6.30, 8.92) 3.10 (2.77, 3.46) 4.6 (2.6, 6.6) 60 (34, 87) 99.995����
Canada No ! b,c,e 18.70 (15.51, 22.07) 7.51 (6.46, 8.76) 10 (5, 15) 54 (27, 81) 99.985���
United States No !
b,c,d,e
16.28 (12.60, 20.20) 4.72 (4.01, 5.49) 12 (5.7, 18) 72 (34, 110) 99.995����
France No ! b,c,e 18.34 (13.17, 24.14) 4.01 (2.39, 6.10) 15 (5.5, 24) 79 (29, 128) 99.900��
GermanyNo ! b,c,e 15.88 (11.68, 20.48) 5.36 (4.55, 6.21) 11 (3.3, 18) 67 (21, 113) 99.715��
Chinab,c,d ! a,b,c,d 17.29 (12.90, 22.04) 0.72 (0.52, 0.96) 16 (10, 23) 96 (60, 132) 99.995����
Chinaa,b,c,d ! a,b,d 0.72 (0.52, 0.96) 4.36 (2.62, 7.21) -3.6 (-3.2, -3.9) -464 (-508, -418) 99.995����
Chinaa,b,d ! a,b,e 4.36 (2.62, 7.21) 1,94 (0.85, 3.40) 2.4 (-1.2, 5.9) 55 (-29, 136) 91.001
KoreaNo !a,b,c 13.98 (9.13, 19.93) 1.34 (1.12, 1.58) 14 (6, 21) 91 (40, 142) 99.965���
Japan No ! a 12.60 (8.30, 17.27) 7.76 (6.00, 9.58) 5.8 (-1.2, 13) 43 (-8.7, 94) 95.085�
Japana ! a,b,e 7.76 (6.00, 9.58) 9.93 (7.79, 12.07) -2.2 (-4.7, 0.29) -29 (-61, 3.7) 96.025�
Japana,b,e ! a,e 9.93 (7.79, 12.07) 4.56 (2.80, 6.50) 5.4 (1.9, 9) 54 (19, 90) 99.870��
Japana,e ! a,c,d,e 4.56 (2.80, 6.50) 1.63 (1.16, 2.07) 3.1 (0.46, 5.7) 65 (9.7, 121) 98.960�
Singaporea! a,b,c,e 11.38 (9.91, 12.96) 5.09 (4.11, 6.19) 6.6 (3, 10) 56 (26, 87) 99.985���
Hong Konga ! a,b,c,e 8.36 (6.79, 10.01) 0.67 (0.32, 1.09) 7.8 (4.8, 11) 92 (56, 128) 99.995����
Taiwana,b ! a 4.46 (2.65, 6.59) 8.93 (6.47, 11.74) -4.3 (-7.5, -1.2) -95 (-164, -25) 99.565�





a: centralized isolation of all confirmed cases
b: closure of schools
c: closure of public areas
d: closure of cities
e: closure of borders
We analyzed national interventions of each country at the moment of the 10th confirmed cases. The countries applied their control measures before or after this
moment independently. As a result, we defaulted that before the arrow “!” was the time before the 10th confirmed cases, and after the ‘”!” was the time after the 10th
confirmed cases; and “No” meant that there was no intervention at that time.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0254012.t002
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without strict lockdowns (South Korea); they applied methoda. Group B consisted of European
and North American countries with strict lockdown policies (Canada, France, Germany,
Spain, Italy, United Kingdom, and the United States) and Sweden; they did not apply methoda.
Group A represented a slow elevation of new cases, as well as a low number of total confirmed
cases, regardless of the implementation of the closure of cities and borders, proven by a
decrease in new case indices of countries in the group. In this group, Taiwan, Singapore, and
Hong Kong isolated all of their confirmed casesa before the 10th case at 11 days, 8 days, and 4
days, respectively. Next, Japan and South Korea applied methodsa after their 10th cases at 16
days and 27 days, respectively. Exceptionally, China isolated all confirmed cases 14 days after
the country’s announcement of the outbreak of COVID-19 on January 20, 2020, with 219 con-
firmed cases. When South Korea and China had their first confirmed cases of COVID-19, the
countries did not isolate all of the confirmed casesa. This reluctance led to a rapid rise in the
number of new cases in these two countries. At this time, new case indices of South Korea and
China were on a comparable trend to the countries in group B. However, when the centralized
isolation of all confirmed casesa was officially implemented on the 14th day in China and the
27th day in South Korea, the two countries were able to flatten the curve of the confirmed cases
of COVID-19 after 13 days of applying methoda (Fig 1).
In group A, due to the early implementation of centralized isolation of all confirmed cases
in Taiwan and Hong Kong, these two countries had lower new case indices compared to
Japan, South Korea, and China, which postponed the application of methoda. According to the
analysis, after 60 days since the 10th confirmed case, South Korea had 9,661 confirmed cases,
whereas this number in Japan, Singapore, Hong Kong, and Taiwan were 1,866 (19.3% com-
pared to South Korea), 844 (8.7% compared to South Korea), 561 (5.8% compared to South
Korea), and 306 (3.2% compared to South Korea), respectively. Furthermore, after 100 days
Fig 1. Analysis of anti-epidemic solutions according to the number of COVID-19 cases trajectories.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0254012.g001
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since the 10th confirmed case, Singapore had 21,707 confirmed cases, while this number in
Japan, South Korea, Hong Kong, and Taiwan were 15,575 (by 71.8% compared to Singapore),
10,874 (50.0% compared to Singapore), 1,044 (4.8% compared to Singapore), and 440 (2.0%
compared to Singapore), respectively (Fig 2). Thus, the earlier that centralized isolation for all
confirmed cases was put in place, the more effective the method was at decreasing the new
case index of COVID-19. Conversely, in group B, which only applied social distancing mea-
sures such as the closure of schools, public areas, and borders without the centralized isolation
of all confirmed cases, there were no significant decreases in the number of new cases. Notably,
the United States witnessed a high intensity of infection regardless of the closure of these areas.
As for Sweden, the number of estimated total confirmed cases (dash line) was comparable to
that of countries in group B when the number of new cases has not reached its peak. In which
Spain, Italy, the United Kingdom, Germany, and France lessened the day of achieving the
highest new cases (day 29th, day 30th, day 47th, day 55th, and day 65th, respectively), Sweden
reached the peak of cases in day 118th with 62,728 confirmed cases according to government
reports and 560,895 estimates. The results show that when Sweden did not apply any measur-
esa,b,c,d,e and the peak time was 1.8–4.1 times longer than other countries.
On the other hand, the application of centralized isolation would no longer be effective
without other solutions such as closing public places, schools, cities, or borders; when the
number of active cases was over 400. This was exemplified in Japan. After 40 days since the
number of active cases became greater than 400 cases (active cases > 400) in Japan, all meth-
odsa,b,c,d,e were no longer sufficient to control the rise of new cases, as the active cases increased
19 times with 7,547 active cases (active cases = confirmed cases–death cases–recovered cases).
Even when Japan applied methodsa,b,c,d,e synchronously, after only 14 days since reaching the
point of “active cases > 400”, the active cases kept rising significantly, in fact, 28 times,
Fig 2. The comparison of countries’ active cases since the 10th confirmed case of COVID-19.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0254012.g002
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reaching a total of 11,198 active cases. This trend was comparable to Singapore when the coun-
try implemented methodsa,b,c,e after 16 days since reaching the point of “active cases > 400”,
and the number of active cases tripled to 1,211. Moreover, this number increased rapidly, 52
times, with 20,799 active cases when Singapore also applied methodsa,b,c,e synchronously after
34 days since reaching the point of “active cases > 400”.
In contrast, Hong Kong’s active cases increased gradually 1.5 times with 676 active cases,
when the government applied methodsa,b,c,e after 2 days since “active cases > 400”. Once
again, the data showed that the sooner the countries had measuresa,b,c,d,e in place, the more
sufficiently they could control the pandemic.
Additionally, in order to verify and emphasize our above findings, the two important met-
rics, such as doubling time, as well as time-varying reproduction number in pre-intervention
and post-intervention periods, were also calculated. These two metrics are widely used to eval-
uate the spread of infectious diseases. The doubling time is the required time to duplicate the
number of infected peoples. Given the exponential growth of an epidemic and the constant
growth rate r, the doubling time needed is calculated as (ln 2)/r. Thus, an elevation in doubling
time suggests a reduction in virus transmission. In our study, the doubling time was calculated
by the days that the positive cases increase to double values or the days that the increase of pos-
itive cases reaches 100% [12]. Fig 3 demonstrated that the United States suffered the highest
doubling time, which was 14 times. In contrast, Taiwan, with its reasonably preventive policies,
had the lowest doubling time in our analysis. Indeed, 100 days since 10th confirmed cases,
group A, which was using the centralized isolation of all confirmed cases, resulted in a lower
doubling time: Japan and Singapore’s doubling times were 9 and 10, respectively; and the
Fig 3. Doubling time analysis.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0254012.g003
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other four countries in this group had the doubling times under 8. In reverse, the doubling
time in group B seems to be more serious, with the excess of the 8th doubling time just after
20–40 days. Notably, the 11th doubling time presented from day 30th to day 70th since the 10th
case. In China and South Korea, without centralized isolation of all confirmed cases, their 7th
doubling times were just after 20th day and 34th day, respectively, in the pandemic’s early stage.
However, after applying the aforementioned measure, their doubling times just increased for
one more scale after 70 days.
Regarding reproduction rate RR, it evaluates how effective the control measures are in miti-
gating the growth of the confirmed cases. This index is estimated by the average the population
who become infected by one infectious person. Alternatively, it can be calculated through the
number of mortality [13]. If RR is under 1, the spread of the virus is slowing. Whereas if the
value is greater than 1, the virus spread is increasing [14]. Our study evaluated the effectiveness
of intervention through RR before and after applying these solutions. The reproduction rate is
obtained from the database of the “Our World In Data” (https://ourworldindata.org/
coronavirus-data), a project output of the Oxford Martin Programme on Global Development
from the University of Oxford. However, during the early stage of the pandemic, the number
of death cases was low, leading to difficulties in estimating the reproduction rate. Therefore,
we estimated the missing values by estimating the correlation between the reproduction rate
and the ratio of new cases (dayn) and new cases (day n-1). The time-varying of reproduction
rate for all the relevant countries was outlined in Fig 4. On the 13th day, countries in group B,
which did not apply any control measures, had an average reproduction rate of 2.23 (0.38).
However, after applying measures such as the closing of schools, public areas, and borders, this
index achieved a reduction from 1.2 to 2.5 points (S8 Table). For countries in group A, the
average reproduction rate was 1.28 (0.64) before applying closing public areas, cities, or bor-
ders. However, when they used the above measures, this rate fluctuated between 0.093 and 1.1.
In testing with the fluctuation from 1 to 4 days, the analysis showed similar statistical results
with an insignificant difference.
Discussion
In this work, we demonstrate that the early implementation of confirmed cases’ centralized
isolation was the most effective strategy in decreasing the incidence of new COVID-19 cases.
Thus, we can deduce that even in the face of an unknown contagion that spreads like wildfire,
or one that may not currently have a curative treatment or a vaccine, the lesson to be learned
here is that early isolation is key to containment and possibly avoiding a pandemic. However,
delaying isolation procedures after confirmed cases have reached more than 400 renders cen-
tralized isolation alone insufficient.
Our research was designed to evaluate the efficaciousness of control measures such as the
closure of schools, closure of public areas, closure of cities, closure of borders, and centralized
isolation of all confirmed cases in mitigating the spread of the pandemic in 14 countries: Can-
ada, China, France, Germany, Hong Kong, Italy, Japan, South Korea, Singapore, Spain, Tai-
wan, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Sweden. Although these measures
implementation varied in each country according to different periods, these solutions were
proven to play a crucial role in significantly reducing the spread of COVID-19 after 13 days of
application. As governments grapple with how to preserve their general infrastructure, econo-
mies and continue classroom education, the data here imparts some valuable wisdom in guid-
ing these decisions. Indeed, centralized isolation of all confirmed cases was determined as a
key control measure, as it helped to remarkably restrict the number of new cases after 13 days
of application and control the spread of the virus at a low level. However, when the number of
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new cases reached over 400 cases, the centralized isolation of all confirmed cases lost its effect
if social distancing-related control measures were not simultaneously applied. Particularly, the
number of new cases in countries with applications of centralized isolation of all confirmed
cases was proven to be lesser than that without the application of this measure. For example,
Taiwan opted to reopen its schools before closing public areas. As a result, the absolute effec-
tive average (defined as the average percent decrease rate of the trend after intervention/day)
increased to 4.3%. This conveys that keeping educational institutions closed is also crucial to
decrease the incidence of new COVID-19 cases.
Fig 4. Absolute effect of government policies on reproduction rate.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0254012.g004
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The 14 countries were divided into two groups; group A enlisted the centralized isolation
control measure, while group B did not. Interestingly enough, Western countries dominated
group B and showed the largest flux in cases (Fig 2). In Fig 1, countries in group A, with the
application of centralized isolation of all confirmed cases, represented better management of
new confirmed cases than countries in group B. This finding is in line with the study of Zhu
et al. [15]. In countries such as China and South Korea that did not apply the centralized isola-
tion of all confirmed cases since the beginning of new cases, the curve flattened after 13 days of
applying this measure. In contrast, countries including Singapore, Germany, Japan, Taiwan,
and Hong Kong (in group A), showed a distinct low curve of new cases compared to group B.
Currently, while vaccination and approved drugs for COVID-19 require time to assess its
efficaciousness, the management of the sources of infection, as well as routes of transmission,
remain the vital factors to control the pandemic. However, given the possibility of transmis-
sion of SARS-CoV-2 through respiratory droplets [11, 16, 17], air [18, 19], and direct contact
with contaminated surfaces [20, 21]; control of the common routes of transmission of SARS-
CoV-2 is not sufficient when we let the confirmed cases be self-isolated at home. The rationale
behind this is that these individuals continue to do their daily activities such as buying food,
entering local pharmacies, and patronizing other businesses, which might result in an increase
in the risk of community spread.
The study sets itself apart amidst the sea of data on COVID-19 because it provides a consol-
idated, systematic comparison of measures utilized by 14 countries significantly impacted by
COVID-19 in their efforts to lower the spread of the virus. In the initial months of a rapidly
spreading pandemic, governments and healthcare systems alike struggled to harness enough
data to approach patient treatment and the public health crisis with acumen. By utilizing the
Causal Impact Package, we were able to conduct a study that made randomized controlled tri-
als impossible. This approach, coupled with the Bayesian inference method and Markov
Chains Monte Carlo, allowed us to observe the impact of centralized isolation of all confirmed
cases, closure of schools, closure of public areas, closure of cities, and closure of borders; on
case indices pre-and post-intervention.
Given that our evaluation in Figs 1 and 2 might be subjective, we have performed the cause-
effect analysis to assess the control measures’ impact on the speed of infection between the cur-
rent and newly infected people. This method is frequently applied in public health and the
economy to estimate the counterfactual and predict what would happen in the absence of a
treatment [22, 23]. Our result determined that all non-pharmaceutical interventions, including
the closure of schoolsb, closure of public areasc, closure of citiesd, and closure of borders; sig-
nificantly reduced the trend of the new case index. When all of these social distancing methods
were applied, the new case indices varied from 3.86% to 5.92%. When countries applied fewer
solutions, this index ranged from 4.01% to 7.53%. In countries without applying these control
measures, we revealed a high value of new case indices, from 12.60% to 25.98%. Thus, these
social distancing control measures significantly reduced the number of new cases. In the same
manner, our findings were in line with the report of Chaudhry et al., which identified that the
days to partial or full lockdown and the day to any border closures were the two significant
predictors associating with the total number of reported cases per million [24]. Interestingly,
this author also figured out that a full lockdown policy was a supporting factor in increasing
the number of recovered cases. On the other hand, our study determined a crucial role of cen-
tralized isolation of all confirmed cases. In China, the application of centralized isolation of all
confirmed cases, but not the closure of borders, also reduced the new case indices to 0.72%
(95% CI: 0.52, 0.96). In South Korea, a combination of centralized isolation of all confirmed
cases, closure of schools, and closure of public areas decreased the new case indices to 1.34%
(95% CI: 1.12, 1,58). A similar outcome was obtained in Hong Kong with a reduction to 0.67%
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(95% CI: 0.32, 1.09) with the application of centralized isolation of all confirmed cases and clo-
sure of borders, schools, and public areas.
Isolation strategies were key in displacing the upward trend of infection rates due to the
human-to-human spread of COVID-19 being the mechanism of rising new cases. After only
13 days of applying the centralized isolation method, despite failing to initially isolate all con-
firmed cases, as demonstrated in Fig 1, South Korea and China could flatten the confirmed
cases’ curve via centralized isolation. Furthermore, Taiwan and Hong Kong had even lower
new case indices because they put centralized isolation into effect early. However, a potential
limitation could be if cases exceeded the 1000 threshold in the early stages upon discovering a
pneumonia-like illness before centralized isolation could be implemented. At that juncture,
the immediate move would be to enlist other measures such as social distancing, wearing
masks, closure of schools, and closure of public spaces. Of note, confirmed cases of>400 with
all methods implemented still demonstrated a trend of increasing new cases. Therefore, it
again brings us back to the evidence fleshed out by the data; early implementation of central-
ized isolation when confirmed cases are low (<100) is imperative to controlling the spread.
History has shown that a two-step with the Coronavirus family is not a singular battle of the
SARS outbreak in Guangdong, China in 2002 [6] and the MERS outbreak in Saudi Arabia in
2012 [7]. Hence, one of the main takeaways here is there is an urgent need to redesign govern-
ment and healthcare systems-level protocols in response to pneumonia-like illnesses and (or)
those that are suspected of spreading via respiratory droplets.
Without a doubt, early and rapid action by governments and healthcare workers to isolate
confirmed cases of COVID-19 played a key role in lowering the case indices for countries that
implementing the strategies before reaching the threshold that required additive measures.
However, as human nature dictates, adherence to isolation and other strategies, e.g., social dis-
tancing and wearing masks, can be difficult when not strictly enforced. Thus protocols for
enhancing community compliance with the secondary measures to contain the spread further
must be studied.
Despite careful preparation, we acknowledged some limitations in our study that need to be
identified. At first, the assumed period of 14 days might be a senseful approximation since the
time between the onset of symptoms and testing is hardly detectable. Even though our study
demonstrated the crucial role of centralized isolation in fighting the pandemic and may make
other measures superfluous, but only if this measure is imposed at an early stage of virus
spread, we also face a current challenge of identification all infections at an early stage of the
outbreak. Detection of asymptomatic but infected people who had never been tested repre-
sented as an important matter that needed to be discussed. Besides, Asian countries with
smaller territory sizes and accumulated gaining experiences of SAR-CoV-1 in the past had a
greater benefit to tackle the spread of this infectious disease than European and American
countries. Furthermore, Asian countries with “authoritarian government” and “collectivist
culture” that pushed societal interests to the forefront might be easily adapted the lockdown
policy. In contrast, European and American countries where “individualistic culture” is domi-
nant are challenging to comply with strict enforcement of regulations. Finally, the heterogene-
ity in the analysis is unavoidable due to difficulties to reach a comparable definition of the time
for each measure in countries such as the United States, Canada, and China. Also, there were
differences in testing policies and the criteria of confirmed cases in each country.
Conclusion
Our analysis determined that early centralized isolation was represented as a core intervention
in significantly disrupting the pandemic’s spread, especially in South Korea. This strategy also
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helped Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Japan in successfully controlling the crisis in the
early stage, when the total number of cases were under 100, without the requirement of the clo-
sure of cities and public areas; which could impose a negative impact on the society and econ-
omy. However, when the number of cases increased with the apparition of new clusters,
coordination between centralized isolation and non-pharmaceutical interventions would facil-
itate controlling the crisis efficiently.
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